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cause the employees’ customer orientation has opposing effects on the profits obtained by
the firms. On the one hand, customer-oriented employees provide a given level of quality for
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1 Introduction
Customer-oriented employees are interested not only in their wages, but also in satisfying
customers’ needs. It is natural to think of these workers as employed in non-profits
organizations or in the public service provision, such as the health care and education
sectors (see for example Francois, 2000, Biglaiser and Ma, 2007, and Delfgaauw and Dur,
2008). However, profit-maximizing firms can also attract customer-oriented employees by
offering them jobs that have a valuable impact or a socially oriented mission. Psychologists
and marketing scholars argue that this is more likely to be the case in the service sector,
where there is a strong interaction between customers and employees.1 The marketing
literature also finds a positive relationship between the employees’ customer orientation
and the customers’ satisfaction.2 For this reason, the employees’ customer orientation
is considered to be an important factor for service firms’ economics success (see Bove
and Johnson, 2000, and Sergeant and Frenkel, 2000). Therefore, firms may want to have
a customer-oriented workforce to satisfy customers’ needs in an attempt to win market
shares and increase profits.
In the economics literature, the impact of employees’ customer orientation on the cus-
tomers’ satisfaction and on the firms’ profits has not yet been studied. Although it may
come as a foregone conclusion that profit-maximizing firms would be better off if their
customers are more satisfied, this relationship is in fact far from being obvious. The main
contribution of this article is to show that in the presence of competition the strategic in-
teraction between firms may lead to surprising results concerning the desirability of hiring
customer-oriented employees. Firms may obtain higher profits by hiring self-interested
rather than customer-oriented employees. However, they find themselves trapped in a
prisoners’ dilemma as the strategy of hiring self-interested agents is strictly dominated by
that of hiring customer-oriented agents. In other words, firms end up hiring customer-
oriented employees even when they would prefer to coordinate and hire selfish employees,
but they cannot credibly commit to that.
To model competition, I use a Salop model where profit-maximizing firms offer both
horizontally and vertically differentiated products3 and decide whether to hire selfish or
customer-oriented employees. While the utility function of a selfish employee only depends
on his “egoistic” payoff (given by the difference between the wage and the cost of exerting
1Saxe and Weitz (1982) are the first to describe a concern for customers in the service sector and
then Hogan et al. (1984) have defined employees’ service orientation as “a set of attitudes and behaviors
affecting the quality of interaction between an organization’s employees and its customers”.
2Hennig-Thurau (2004) tests empirically a sample of 989 consumers for two service sectors (i.e.
book/CD/DVD retailers and travel agencies). This author finds a positive relationship between customer-
orientation and customers’ satisfaction. For related studies see also Hennig-Thurau and Thurau (2003)
and Donavan et al. (2004).
3Restaurants are a suitable example of a sector offering horizontally and vertically differentiated
products. Restaurants offer different menus, i.e. products are horizontally differentiated. In addition,
the quality provided by the restaurants is different and is affected by the effort exerted by their own
employees, i.e. products are vertically differentiated.
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effort), the utility function of a customer-oriented employee also positively depends on the
customers’ well-being. The baseline model is analyzed under the assumption of perfect
information on the employees’ type. But the main results are robust when this assumption
is relaxed.
The employees’ customer orientation has conflicting effects on the firms’ profits at
the equilibrium. On the one hand, the presence of customer-oriented employees has a
positive effect on profits thanks to a wage reduction. Customer-oriented employees provide
goods of a given level of quality for a lower wage. This is because the agent’s customer
orientation reduces the agent’s marginal cost of eliciting effort. On the other hand, it has
a negative impact on profits through a reduction in the price of the products offered by the
firms. When the employees care about the customers’ well-being, the employees’ utility
decreases if the firm decides to charge a higher price. The agent’s customer orientation
makes employees more sensitive to prices and qualities, thus forcing firms to compete
more fiercely and to lower their prices. This latter effect can be large enough to outweigh
the gain generated by lower wages.
When the negative effect on the profits dominates, firms find themselves trapped in a
prisoners’ dilemma, and the presence of customer-oriented employees hurts firms. Which
effect dominates is crucially affected by the degree of competition in the market. Specif-
ically, the prisoners’ dilemma is more likely to occur in markets with less substitutable
products and fewer firms. Therefore, when the market is more concentrated, firms would
be better off hiring selfish agents.
As for the impact of the employees’ customer orientation on the customers’ welfare,
this is unambiguously positive when the number of firms is exogenous. A higher degree
of employee’s customer orientation increases competition reducing the price charged by
the firms. However, this positive effect of the employees’ customer orientation on the
customers’ well-being may be mitigated or become negative when the number of firms is
endogenous. This is because fewer firms enter the market when the gross profits obtained
by hiring selfish agents are higher than those obtained by hiring customer-oriented agents.
Because of horizontal differentiation a wider variety of goods is beneficial to customers.
It is important to notice that a monopolistic firm always benefits from hiring a
customer-oriented employee. A higher customer orientation induces the monopolistic
firm to increase both quality and price. For each unit of the product which is sold, the
firm is able to charge a higher price to reflect the higher product quality. Crucially, the
monopoly is also able to attract new customers and enjoys an increase in the demand.
In contrast, when there is competition, by offering a more valuable product firms do not
attract additional customers. This is because firms follow the same strategy and, as a
result, they share the demand in the market.
The key assumption of this article is that motivated employees are not only interested
in their “egoistic” payoff but also in the customers’ well-being. In other words, these
employees have altruistic preferences towards their customers.4 More specifically, in my
4“A person is altruistic if her utility increases with the well-being of other people” (Fehr and Schmidt,
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model, motivated employees exhibit pure altruism because they internalize in their own
utility the effects that both prices and quality entail for customers’ utility. When this
is the case, employees also care about the price charged by the firms and the firms can
extract a lower amount of surplus from their customers for any given level of quality. This
stands in contrast with impure altruism which would lead to a model where motivated
employees derive utility from the quality of the good they provide. If motivated employees
were merely interested in the quality of the goods/services, the strategic effect on the price
outlined before would disappear. Therefore, whether these motivated employees have pure
or impure altruistic preferences leads to dramatically different conclusions concerning the
desirability of hiring a motivated workforce.
Since the main results of the paper crucially depend on the employees’ interest in the
customers’ well-being rather than just in the quality of the good provided, the analysis
calls for additional empirical studies to investigate what drives employees’ actions. The
existing experimental evidence is mostly consistent with the assumption of impure altru-
ism (see among others Tonin and Vlassopoulos, 2010, 2015, Imas, 2014, and Charness
et al., 2016). However, some experimental and empirical studies have found supportive
evidence for pure altruistic motives or for both forms of altruism (see Konow, 2010, Gregg
et al., 2011, Lilley and Slonim, 2014, and Ottoni-Wilhelm et al., 2014).
The remainder of the article proceeds as follows. In the next section the related
literature is reviewed; in Section 3 the model is presented and a monopolistic environment
is analyzed; in Section 4 the equilibrium of the model is characterized for a given number of
firms; in Section 5 the conditions under which the prisoners’ dilemma arises are illustrated;
in Section 6 some robustness checks are studied; concluding remarks and discussion of the
results are given in Section 7.
2 Related Literature
This article is related to the literature on psychological incentives and to the one on
the effects of competition on managerial incentives. The former focuses on the existing
interaction between intrinsic motivation and monetary incentives without considering the
role played by competition in shaping the monetary incentives of the employees. The
latter focuses on the impact of competition on the incentives without considering potential
differences in the agents’ preferences. I bridge these two strands of the literature by
considering the interaction between monetary incentives and the agents’ motivation in a
competitive environment.
The economics literature on psychological incentives shows that employees derive non-
monetary benefits from providing some types of services (see Biglaiser and Ma, 2007,
2006). This hypothesis has a long tradition in economics and may account for charitable donations and
the voluntary provision of public goods (see for example Andreoni and Miller, 2002). In Andreoni (1989,
1990), the author argues that there may be other motives to contribute to the public good, such as social
pressure, guilt, or a desire of “warm glow”, and he distinguishes between pure and impure altruism.
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Buurman et al., 2012, and Dur and Zoutenbier, 2014). The idea is that employees care
about the recipients of the service, i.e. they are worried about the welfare of their patients,
students, or customers. This idea has mainly been referred to public service employees
(see among others Bond and Glode, 2011, and Jaimovich and Rud, 2014). In particular,
most studies have argued that public service employees are eager to serve the others and
satisfy the customers’ needs (see Francois, 2000, 2007, Glazer, 2004, and Macchiavello,
2008). As a result, this literature has emphasized how, especially in the public service or
non-profit sectors, the employers can extract labor donations from motivated employees
(see Francois and Vlassopoulos, 2008, for a survey).5 While these articles study the
sorting of differently motivated people into public sector and its consequences for optimal
pay policies and organizational design, I study how the presence of customers’ oriented
employees impacts on firms’ profits and customers’ well-being. Moreover, there are some
remarkable differences in how this “pro-social” motivation is included in the employees’
utility function. In some articles, the motivation component is represented as a function
of the effort exerted by the employee with a positive first derivative. That is, an employee
directly benefits from increasing his own level of effort, or, equivalently, the employee has
a lower marginal cost of exerting effort. In Besley and Ghatak (2005) for example the
employees’ effort costs are low when they share the firm’s mission.6 In other articles,
employees care about the quality of the good that is provided. For example, in Francois
(2007) the employees derive a benefit when the good provided is deemed socially valuable.
One remarkable departure of my model from the literature on psychological incentives is
that employees can be interested in the customers’ well-being rather than in the quality
per se. When this is the case, employees are more sensitive to prices and qualities, thus
forcing firms to compete more fiercely and to lower their prices. This reduction in the
price can be sufficiently large as to outweigh the gain engendered by the reduction in
wages.7
This article is also related to the literature on the effects of competition on managerial
incentives.8 Particularly close is Raith (2003), wherein the author examines how the
5Gregg et al. (2011) use data from the British Household Panel Survey (BHPS) and show that in-
dividuals in the non-profit sector are significantly more likely to do unpaid overtime than those in the
for-profit sector.
6Besley and Ghatak (2005) also consider a competitive environment but the main objective of their
analysis is to study the self-selection of different types of agents between different types of sectors.
7Consistently with the psychological literature, customer-oriented employees provide a given level of
effort for a lower wage. Some articles in this literature also suggest that monetary incentives can have
a negative impact on the effort exerted by motivated employees. For instance, monetary incentives may
change how tasks are perceived by agents (Benabou and Tirole, 2003) and/or they may reduce the value
of generous or civic minded acts as a signal of one’s moral character (Gneezy and Rustichini, 2000a, and
Benabou and Tirole, 2006). If extrinsic incentives are not large enough, this change in perception can
even lead to undesired effects on individuals’ behavior (Gneezy and Rustichini, 2000b).
8Hart (1983) is the first to model the effect of competition on the agency problem between a firm’s
owner and a manager. Scharfstein (1988) reconsiders Hart’s model relaxing the assumption of infinitely
risk-adverse managers. Hermalin (1994) considers additional effects of competition on the agency problem,
5
degree of competition among firms in an industry with free entry and exit impacts on
the wages paid to their employees. The effect of competition on wages and effort takes
place through a change in the equilibrium number of firms in the industry. The results
suggest an unambiguous positive relationship between competition and wages. Like Raith
(2003), this article shows that competition increases the wages paid to self-interested
agents. When products are more substitutable, prices and profits decrease leading to
fewer firms. Each firm produces a higher level of quality and each agent receives a higher
wage. However, when agents are customer-oriented there is an additional effect that goes
in opposite direction. If products are less substitutable, customers are worse off and firms
have to pay higher wages to customer-oriented agents to keep the level of quality constant.
Baggs and De Bettignies (2007) also study how product market competition affects
employee effort and firm efficiency. They show that the impact of competition differs
depending on whether or not they are subject to agency costs. Similar to their paper,
I use a spatial competition model in which firms offer both horizontally and vertically
differentiated products.
Finally, the results of my paper are to some extent linked with those presented in
Fershtman and Judd (1987). In a Cournot model, these authors show that owners offer
incentives to their managers which depend also on sales, even though they would have
been better off providing incentives based just on profits. Thus, firms find themselves
trapped in a prisoners’ dilemma concerning which incentive contract they offer to their
employees. Conversely, in my article the prisoners’ dilemma pertains to the type of
employee that is hired. Moreover, the result of Fershtman and Judd (1987) is driven by
the existence of asymmetric information between owners and employees about demands
and/or costs. Therefore, they shed light on how the presence of asymmetric information
distorts incentives away from efficiency. In contrast, I highlight how the presence of
customer-oriented agents can hurt firms in a complete information setting.9 There is no
need to add any informational friction in the model to attain the prisoners’ dilemma.
3 The Model
A continuum of customers of mass 1 is distributed uniformly on a Salop circle (Salop,
1979), whose perimeter is normalized to 1. Each customer buys exactly one unit of
the good. There are n profit-maximizing firms that operate in the market and that
are positioned equidistantly around the circle.10 The products offered by the firms are
horizontally differentiated. Each firm consists of a principal and an agent, both risk
neutral. The principal-agent relationship can be interpreted as the relationship between
all of which are of potentially ambiguous sign. Schmidt (1997) shows that greater competition may lead
to stronger incentives for agents because greater effort is required to avert the threat of bankruptcy.
9In addition, the equilibrium inefficiency in Fershtman and Judd (1987) also depends on the possibility
of setting a negative fixed wage.
10The number of firms is initially assumed to be exogenous.
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the owner of the firm who offers a contract in terms of quality of the product q and wage
ω to an employee (the agent).
The agents are wealth constrained with zero initial wealth and have a reservation
wage of zero. They have quadratic effort costs, which are observable to the principal.
The effort exerted determines the quality of the services. Thus, the products are also
vertically differentiated. I normalize the quality q in such a way that it linearly depends
on the employees’ effort. There is no asymmetric information between the principal and
the agent. As quality is verifiable, the principals need not offer an incentive to the agents
because they have all the necessary information to implement the efficient levels of quality.
I depart from the traditional Salop model by assuming that agents’ utilities might
positively depend on the well-being of the customers. The parameter θ measures the
employees’ customer orientation. There are two types of agents, the self-interested agents
with θ = 0 and the customer-oriented agents with θ > 0, and their type is observable.11
Moreover, the number of agents of each type is larger than n. This means that there is
perfect competition in the labour market. In this way, I have abstracted from potential
problems concerning the firms’ selection of employees with different degrees of customer-
orientation when they are in limited supply. This simplifying assumption allows me to
focus on the impact of the presence of customer-oriented employees on firms’ profits and
on the customers’ well-being, which is the main purpose of the article.12
After the employment decision, the firms offer imperfectly substitutable services, com-
peting against each other on quality q and prices p.
The timing of the model is as follows. In stage 1, each principal decides whether
to hire a customer-oriented or a self-interested agent; In stage 2, each principal offers a
contract in terms of the wage and the effort to his agent. Each agent accepts any contract
which yields an expected utility of at least his reservation utility of 0; In stage 3, agents
produce the good exerting the effort determined by the contract; finally, in stage 4, the
customers choose from which firm to buy the good and profits are realized.
The principal can condition the wage on both quality and price. This is so as both
factors may enter the agent’s utility function. The quality enters the utility function
both directly, as it affects the amount of effort the agent must exert, and indirectly, as
it impacts on the customers’ utility about which the agent may care. In contrast, price
only affects the agent’s utility function indirectly through its impact on the customers’
well-being.
11In Section 6, I show that the main results are robust when this assumption is relaxed.
12The main results still hold when there is a limited supply of customer-oriented employees. This case
is analyzed as a robustness check in Subsection 6.3.
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3.1 The Objective Function
Take a generic firm i. If a customer k purchases one unit of the good from firm i, his
utility is:
Uik = v(qi)− pi − t xik, (1)
where v(qi) = v + qi represents the customer’s benefit from the good offered by firm i.
Customers derive a non-negative utility v from the good irrespective of its quality, i.e.
v ≥ 0. The distance between firm i and customer k is denoted by xik. Customer k incurs
a “transportation cost”, t xik, from traveling to firm i and a cost of t
(
1
n
− xik
)
to the next
firm i+ 1. The exogenous parameter t represents the degree of horizontal differentiation
of the goods offered by the firms. When t is low, firms offer similar goods and competition
is tough. A customer buys the good if he obtains a non-negative utility.
Being that Salop’s is a model of localized competition, every firm competes only with
the immediate neighbors. Each firm has only two competitors, those located to the right
and left of it. Profits are given by the difference between revenues and the wage paid to
the agent:
pii = pi di − ωi, (2)
where pi and di are the price and the demand of firm i, respectively, and ωi the wage paid
to his agent.
The key assumption of this model is that employees may have pure altruistic pref-
erences towards their customers. When this is the case, they are not only interested in
providing high quality per se but care about the customers’ well-being.13 Hence, they are
also interested in the prices that are charged for the products. This assumption is partic-
ularly reasonable in the service sector whenever there is a strong interaction between the
employees and the customers and this idea is advocated by psychologists and marketing
scholars.
Applications of pure altruism are often found with smaller settings, such as the family
environment where it is natural to think that an individual might care about the well-
being of another member of his family (see Becker, 1974, 1981, and Cherchye et al., 2015).
In larger contexts, it can plausibly be assumed that an individual cares about the average
or total welfare of other individuals in the population (see Daube and Ulph, 2016). To
simplify the math and for ease of exposition, in what follows I assume that employees
care about the utility of the average customer buying the product from their firm.14
The agents’ utility function consists of their own “egoistic” payoff, given by the differ-
ence between wage and effort costs, and their “customer orientation” payoff. Therefore,
the utility of an agent who works in firm i is given by:
Vi = ωi − 1
2
q2i + θiU i, (3)
13This is in contrast with the case in which the employees only care about the quality (impure altruism)
that is analyzed in Subsection 5.2.
14As a robustness check, the case in which the employees care about the overall utility of the customers
buying the product from their firm is considered in Subsection 6.2.
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where U i represents the weighted average utility of the customer buying a product from
firm i. This utility is equal to: U i = v(qi) − pi − t2
[
α1xil+α2xil′
(α1+α2)
]
, with α1 + α2 = 1; α1
and α2 are the normalized weights attached to the customers to the right and left of firm
i, respectively, and coincide with their relative masses; l (respectively l′) is the customer
located to the right (left) of firm i who is indifferent between firm i and firm i + 1 (firm
i− 1).
The model is solved under the assumption that the market is covered. In particular,
the parameters are set in such a way that customers obtain a non-negative utility by buy-
ing the product irrespective of whether firms hire selfish or customer-oriented employees
(see Assumption 1 in the appendix). Moreover, the values of the parameters are such
that an interior solution is guaranteed.15 All the mathematical computations and proofs
of the results are in the appendix.
3.2 A Monopolistic firm
As a benchmark case, I consider the equilibrium of a monopolistic firm.
Proposition 1. In equilibrium, a monopolistic firm always hires a customer-oriented
agent.
If a monopolistic firm hires a customer-oriented agent, the quality of its product is
higher relative to the case in which the agent is selfish. The higher quality allows the firm
to charge a higher price and to increase demand for its product. Moreover, the agent’s
customer orientation reduces the agent’s marginal cost of exerting an additional unit of
effort. As a result, a customer-oriented agent receives a lower wage than a selfish agent.
All these effects lead to higher profits and explain why the monopolistic firm always
benefits from the presence of a customer-oriented agent.
The following lemma summarizes the impact of a change in the employee’s customer
orientation on quality, price, demand, wage, and profits of the monopolistic firm.
Lemma 1. The effects of an increase in the employee’s customer orientation in monopoly
are the following:
∂q
∂θ
> 0;
∂p
∂θ
> 0;
∂d
∂θ
> 0;
∂ω
∂θ
< 0;
∂Π
∂θ
> 0.
In the next section, I characterize the equilibrium in a competitive environment.
15The interval to which the parameters θ, t, n and v must belong to are reported in Appendix A.
9
4 Competition and Employees’ Customer Orienta-
tion
The equilibrium is determined by backward induction.
In the last stage of the game, customers choose from which firm to buy the good. A
customer l is indifferent between firm i and i + 1 if his utility from buying the product
from firm i, Uil, is equal to his utility from buying the product from firm i + 1, Ui+1 l.
Mathematically, this is the case when Uil = Ui+1l, or equivalently
v + qi − pi − t xil = v + qi+1 − pi+1 − t
(
1
n
− xil
)
.
This implies that xil =
1
2n
+ (qi−qi+1)+(pi+1−pi)
2t
and similarly xil′ =
1
2n
+ (qi−qi−1)+(pi−1−pi)
2t
.
The demand for firm i is given by xil + xil′ , that is:
di =
1
n
+
[2qi − qi+1 − qi−1] + [pi+1 + pi−1 − 2pi]
2t
. (4)
Knowing the demand, principal i maximizes the following profits:
pii = pi
[
1
n
+
[2qi − qi+1 − qi−1] + [pi+1 + pi−1 − 2pi]
2t
]
− ωi, (5)
subject to the employee’s participation constraint:
ωi − 1
2
q2i + θiU i(qi, pi) ≥ 0. (6)
The firm’s payoff when it employs a customer-oriented or a selfish agent is analyzed for
any possible combination of types hired by the rival firms. This allows a comparison of
the firms’ profits and an analysis of the optimal choice of the agent in stage 1. Let pijkl
denote the profit that firm i obtains when it employs an agent of type j, and its direct
rivals employ agents of type k and l, where j, k, l can be either customer-oriented (M) or
selfish (S) individuals.
Proposition 2. The strategy of hiring a selfish agent is strictly dominated by the strategy
of hiring a customer-oriented agent, i.e. piMkl > pi
S
kl for k, l ∈ {S,M}.
Regardless of whether the rival firms hire customer-oriented agents or not, principal
i is always better-off by hiring a customer-oriented agent. Suppose that all firms were
employing self-interested agents. The generic firm i would be willing to deviate by hiring
a customer-oriented employee. By doing so, its quality would be higher than the quality
provided by the rival firms. With higher quality, firm i would obtain a comparative
advantage in terms of demand and price, and, as a result, its profits would increase.
But then, when one neighbour firm hires a customer-oriented employee, its competitors’
best response is to follow suit. There is a “cascade effect” which leads to a unique Nash
Equilibrium in which every firm hires a customer-oriented agent. Intuitively, an employer
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could pay a lower salary to a customer-oriented employee to implement the same quality-
price pair requested from a selfish employee.
The following lemma shows the solution of the subgame perfect equilibrium of the
game in the presence of competition.
Lemma 2. There is a unique and symmetric subgame perfect equilibrium of the game in
which each firm hires a customer-oriented employee, sets
qMMM =
1
n
, pMMM = t
(
1
n
− 3
4
θ
)
,
and offers a wage which makes the employees’ participation constraint bind, i.e.
ωMMM =
1
2n2
− θ
[
v +
1
n
−
(
t
n
− 3
4
tθ
)
− t
4n
]
.
Firms share the demand in the market dMMM =
1
n
and profits are realized
piMMM =
(
1
n
)(
t
n
− 3
4
tθ
)
−
[
1
2n2
− θ
(
v +
1
n
−
(
t
n
− 3
4
tθ
)
− t
4n
)]
.
As the above lemma shows, the employees’ customer orientation affects neither quality
nor demand, while it has a negative impact on the price charged by the firms. These
results stand in stark contrast with those found under monopoly where quality, demand,
and price increase in the employee’s customer orientation (see Lemma 1). In contrast,
wages are always decreasing in the customer orientation.
To provide an intuition, consider that a customer-oriented employee is willing to exert
more effort if either he receives a higher wage or the customers’ surplus is larger. Therefore,
customer-orientation affects the quality-price pair chosen by the firms. But the direction
of the effects depends on whether or not there is competition in the market.
When there is a monopoly, a higher customer orientation induces the firm to increase
both quality and price. For each unit of the product which is sold, the firm is able to
charge a higher price to reflect the higher product quality. Crucially, the increase in
price is less than proportional to the increase in quality. As a result, the monopoly is
able to attract new customers and enjoys an increase in the demand. Moreover, since the
customers’ surplus has increased, the relationship between customer orientation and wage
is negative.
When there is competition, firms share the demand in the market. Since all firms
follow the same strategy at the equilibrium, each firm’s demand is constant and equal to
1
n
. As firms cannot win additional customers, they do not offer a higher quality product.
However, a firm must charge a lower price to increase the customers’ surplus and pay its
customer-oriented employee a lower wage. Because the other firms do exactly the same,
this price reduction negatively impacts on revenues. If a firm deviated by not reducing
the price, its profits would decrease since part of its demand would be stolen by its
rivals. Notice that at the equilibrium the firms prefer to reduce price maintaining quality
constant, instead of increasing quality keeping the price constant, because providing more
quality is more expensive as it requires more effort.
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5 A Prisoners’ Dilemma
The previous section shows that hiring a customer-oriented agent is a dominant strategy
for each firm. But do firms benefit from hiring a customer-oriented agent? The answer is
provided by the next proposition.
Proposition 3. All firms would obtain higher profits if they colluded to hiring self-
interested rather than customer-oriented agents, i.e. piSSS > pi
M
MM , whenever t > tˆ =
4(nv+1)
8− 3n θ .
For t sufficiently high, all firms would be better off hiring self-interested agents. They
would like to coordinate and hire selfish individuals but they cannot. As I have shown in
the previous section, the strategy of hiring self-interested agents is strictly dominated by
that of hiring customer-oriented agents. Hence, the very presence of a customer-oriented
workforce can hurt firms.16
To understand the reason why the prisoners’ dilemma may arise, it is useful to study
the effect of the different parameters on the firms’ profits more in detail. Consider that
when all firms hire self-interested agents, profits are:
piSSS =
(
1
n
)(
t
n
)
− 1
2n2
=
2t− 1
2n2
; (7)
and, when all firms hire customer-oriented agents, profits are:
piMMM =
(
1
n
)(
t
n
− 3
4
tθ
)
−
[
1
2n2
− θ
(
v +
1
n
− 5
4
t
n
+
3
4
tθ
)]
(8)
Impact of Employees’ Customer Orientation. The employees’ customer orientation has
a countervailing effect on profits. On the one hand, profits increase due to a reduction in
the wage:
ωMMM =
1
2n2
− θ
(
v +
1
n
− 5
4
t
n
+
3
4
tθ
)
<
1
2n2
= ωSSS
Customer-oriented employees derive non-material benefits from providing high-quality
goods to customers. Therefore, they provide a given level of quality for a lower wage
compared to self-interested agents. The higher the employees’ customer orientation, the
lower the wage they receive, i.e.
∂ωMMM
∂θ
< 0. This effect is in line with the literature on
psychological incentives and it would be obtained also if employees were just interested
in quality.
16One might wonder if repeated interaction among firms could sustain an equilibrium in which each
firm hires a selfish agent. However, this would require playing the entire stage game in every period. As
a result, the hiring decision should be taken every time. This is in contrast with real-world employment
contracts whose duration is typically long.
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The employees’ customer orientation also has a negative impact on profits, though.
This is due to a reduction in the price charged by the firms (rent reduction effect):
pMMM =
t
n
− 3
4
tθ <
t
n
= pSSS
The price has a negative impact on the customers’ well-being and indirectly it negatively
impacts on the employees’ utility. For this reason, firms do not charge the same price
as when agents are selfish, thereby extracting less customers’ surplus. Notice that, to
satisfy the employees’ participation constraint, firms prefer to reduce price maintaining
quality constant because providing more quality is more expensive as it requires more
effort. Indeed, firms decide to set the same level of quality in the two scenarios, i.e.
qMMM = q
S
SS. At the same time, since all firms are symmetric and follow the same hiring
strategy, they do not steal market shares from their rivals. This means that firms do not
attract additional customers by offering a lower price. Therefore, the demand does not
change, i.e. dMMM = d
S
SS =
1
n
.
When the negative effect on profits due to the reduction in the price dominates the
positive effect due to the reduction in the wage, firms would obtain higher profits by hiring
selfish rather than customer-oriented employees. All else being equal, this is more likely
to be the case when the employees’ customer orientation is lower. To see this, consider
that an increase in θ has a linear negative impact on the price, while it has an increasingly
negative impact on the wage, i.e.
∂2pMMM
∂θ
2 = 0 and
∂2ωMMM
∂θ
2 > 0. There is a threshold value of
θ below which the negative effect on the price dominates the negative effect on the wage.
To provide an intuition suppose that θ takes a higher value. Firms can now pay a lower
wage to customer-oriented employees even for the initial price-quality pair because the
customers’ utility is positive. Because of competitive pressure, firms are forced to reduce
prices. Even though firms do not attract additional customers by reducing their price,
they do increase the customers’ surplus, and can further decrease the employees’ wage.
The customer-oriented employee is indeed willing to accept a lower salary in exchange for
a greater customer surplus. The more motivated the agent is, the lower the price that
the firm charges to its customers and, in turn, the larger the customers’ surplus. When
θ is small, customers’ surplus is small too, and the effect on profits of the price reduction
outweighs that of the wage reduction. In contrast, when θ is large, customers’ surplus is
already high. This implies that even if the firms did not charge a lower price, the salary
would drop substantially. When this is the case, the benefit stemming from the wage
reduction more than offsets the cost due to the lower profit margin.
Let us now consider the market parameters. Proposition 3 shows that the prisoners’
dilemma is more likely to occur when the market is more concentrated (t is high and/or
n is low), and when the customers have a low valuation of the product (v is low). In what
follows, I explain the impact of each market parameter on the profits more in detail.
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Figure 1: Comparison between profits as a function of t
Impact of Horizontal Differentiation. Figure 1(a) illustrates firms’ profits as a function
of t when all firms hire customer-oriented agents (dashed line) and when all of them would
have hired selfish individuals (solid line). It is important to notice that the dashed line is
flatter than the solid line. To better understand why this occurs, consider the derivative
of the differential profits between piSSS and pi
M
MM with respect to t:
∂(pi∗SSS − pi∗MMM)
∂t
=
θ(8− 3nθ)
4n
> 0.
The degree of differentiation of the products t positively impacts on profits irrespective
of whether the agents are customer-oriented or not. As t takes a higher value, there is
less competition because the products are less substitutable and, as a result, firms can
charge higher prices. However, the positive impact of t on profits is higher when agents
are self-interested. This result depends on two effects, one on the price of the good and
one on wages, that go in the same direction.
First, with customer-oriented employees firms cannot increase the price as much as in
the case in which employees are selfish. This is because a higher price negatively affects
customers’ utility and, through this channel, the employees’ utility. Second, t has no
impact on the wages paid to selfish agents, but it impacts positively on the wages paid
to customer-oriented employees. In addition to the negative effect due to the resulting
higher price, a higher t directly affects the customers’ utility too by making them bear
a higher transport cost. These effects will, in turn, indirectly impact on the utility of
customer-oriented employees, and principals will need to compensate them with higher
salaries so as to satisfy their participation constraints. Hence, the different slopes of the
profits lines in Figure 1.
Impact of the Number of Firms. A higher number of firms in the market reduces
firms’ profits irrespective of whether the agents are customer-oriented or not: both the
solid and the dashed lines tilt down (see the second graph in Figure 1). However, the
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negative impact of the number of firms on the profits is higher when the agents are selfish.
Consider the derivative of the differential profits with respect to n:
∂(piSSS − piMMM)
∂n
= −θ(2t− 1)
n2
< 0.
The above inequality implies that the prisoners’ dilemma occurs for a higher value of t
when the number of firms in the market increases.
To better understand this result, consider that an increase in n has a negative im-
pact on quality but it reduces the distance between customers and firms, leading to a
countervailing effect on the customers’ well-being. Which effect dominates depends on
the degree of differentiation of the products/services. When t is high, namely when firms
offer highly differentiated services, customers are less interested in quality than in the
transport cost. Therefore, they choose a product closer to their location. When this is
the case, an increase in the number of firms n has a positive impact on the customers’
utility. This effect has an indirect positive impact on the employees’ utility allowing the
firm to pay a lower wage and to increase profits by hiring a customer-oriented employee.
This makes the prisoners’ dilemma less likely to arise.
Impact of Customers’ Valuation. An increase in v has a positive impact on firms’
profits when agents are customer-oriented. This is because an increase in v has a positive
impact on the customers’ utility. When customers value more the service offered by
the firms, their utility increases and indirectly this positively impacts on the utility of
a customer-oriented employee. When this is the case, principals can pay this type of
employees a lower wage, leading to an increase in profits. In contrast, since the market
is covered, the customer’s valuation v has no impact on the firms’ profits if agents are
self-interested. Consider the derivative of the differential profits with respect to v:
∂(piSSS − piMMM)
∂v
= −θ < 0.
As v increases, the loss obtained by hiring customer-oriented agents is reduced, when t is
sufficiently high.
Overall, the prisoners’ dilemma is more likely to arise when the degree of differentiation
of the products t is high, and when the agents’ customer orientation θ, the number of
firms n, and the customer’s valuation v are low. Therefore, when the market is more
concentrated, firms would be better off by hiring selfish agents.
5.1 Impact of Parameters on the Customers’ Utility
The average customer’s utility derived from buying a product from firm i when all agents
are selfish and when all agents are customer-oriented are equal to the following terms,
respectively:
U
S
SS = v +
1
n
− 5
4
t
n
; U
M
MM = U
S
SS +
3
4
t θ.
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The degree of product differentiation t has a negative impact on the customer’s utility
irrespective of whether the agents are self-interested or not. As t takes a higher value,
products are more horizontally differentiated. This reduces competition in the market
and increases equilibrium prices. However, the prices paid by the customers when the
agents are customer-oriented are lower than the ones they would pay if they were selfish.
In other words, the negative impact of t is higher when agents are self-interested. This is
a direct consequence of the effects explored in the previous section.
The number of firms n has a positive impact on the customer’s utility if t > 4
5
. As
shown before, an increase in the number of firms reduces the distance between customers
and firms and this leads to an increase in their utility. In contrast, if competition is more
severe, i.e. t < 4
5
, customers are more interested in the quality provided by each firm than
in the transport cost. Since an increase in the number of firms has a negative impact on
quality, this leads to a reduction in the customers’ utility.
The impact of the employees’ customer orientation on the customers’ welfare is un-
ambiguously positive when the number of firms is exogenous. This impact is positive
because θ increases competition reducing the price charged by the firms. However, when
the number of firms is endogenous, there will be an additional effect that goes in the
opposite direction.
When the assumption of an exogenous number of firms is relaxed, there is an additional
stage, stage 0, in which each firm must decide whether to enter the market and incur an
entry cost F ≥ 0, or stay out. The entry cost F affects the degree of competition among
firms and through this channel the customers’ utility. The equilibrium number of firms
competing in the market is determined by the zero-profit condition.17
When the prisoner’s dilemma occurs (t is high), the gross profits obtained by hiring
self-interested agents would be higher than those obtained by hiring customer-oriented
agents, and so would be the number of firms. Because of horizontal differentiation when
t > 4
5
a wider variety of goods is beneficial to customers. Therefore, customer orientation
has a negative effect on the customers’ utility due to a reduction in the number of firms.
Whether this negative effect dominates the positive effect on the customers’ utility due
to the price reduction depends on the values of the parameters. In particular, when t
is sufficiently high and the agent’s customer orientation θ is sufficiently low, the former
effect is higher than the latter.
Remark 1. When the number of firms is endogenous, the positive impact of the agents’
customer orientation on the customers’ utility may be mitigated or become negative.
5.2 Customer-Oriented versus Quality-Oriented Employees
The main results of the paper crucially depend on the assumption that motivated employ-
ees are interested in the customers’ well-being. When employees are customer-oriented,
17Markets with lower entry costs F are more competitive because the number of firms in the market
is larger and therefore prices lower. Remember that firms are equally distributed on the Salop’s circle.
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they also care about the price charged by the firms. As I have highlighted before, in a
competitive environment firms will strategically reduce their price. The magnitude of this
price reduction depends on the employees’ customer orientation and can be large enough
to outweigh the gain generated by lower wages.
In this section I highlight how the results dramatically change when the motivated
employees only care about the quality of the service provided. The utility of a quality-
oriented employee who works in firm i is:
Vˆi = ωi − 1
2
q2i + θqi
I use the notation Vˆi to distinguish quality-oriented employees from customer-oriented
employees.
Lemma 3. There is a unique and symmetric subgame perfect equilibrium of the game in
which each firm hires a quality-oriented employee, sets
qˆMMM =
1
n
+ θ, pˆMMM =
t
n
,
and offers a wage which makes the employees’ participation constraint bind, i.e.
ωˆMMM =
1
2n2
− θ
2
2
.
Firms share the demand in the market dˆMMM =
1
n
and profits are realized
pˆiMMM =
2t− 1
2n2
+
θ
2
2
.
As the above lemma shows, the employees’ quality-orientation does not affect prices,
while it has a positive impact on quality. Intuitively, if motivated employees are merely in-
terested in quality, the strategic effect on the price disappears. Moreover, since the agent’s
marginal cost of eliciting higher effort is reduced, quality-oriented employees provide goods
of a higher quality for a lower wage.18 As a result, the employees’ quality-orientation in-
creases profits. The next proposition illustrates this result.
Proposition 4. Firms are always better off hiring quality-oriented employees.
Therefore, this seemingly negligible difference in the specification of the utility function
leads to dramatically different conclusions concerning the desirability of hiring a motivated
workforce.
This distinction between customer-oriented and quality-oriented employees can be
attributed to the difference between pure and impure altruism. While pure altruistic
agents care about the well-being of others, impure altruistic agents directly benefit from
18Notice that with quality-oriented employees the firm’s cost, i.e. the salary, cannot be reduced by
lowering the price charged to the customers.
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their actions. In my model, customer-oriented employees displays pure altruism because
they care about the customers’ utility. This stands in contrast with the case in which
motivated employees derive utility from the quality of the good they provide. Since quality
linearly depends on the effort exerted by the employees, this case leads to the notion of
impure altruism (see Delfgaauw and Dur, 2007, 2008).
Since the main results of the paper crucially depend on the employees’ interest in the
customers’ well-being rather than just in the quality of the good or service provided, the
analysis calls for additional empirical studies. To test my model one would need to collect
evidence on which preference specification is empirically the most plausible and check if it
depends on the sector/industry considered. The first step would be to determine whether
employees derive non-egoistic benefits from providing some types of services. If this were
the case, the second step would be to determine whether employees are interested in the
customers’ well-being or in the quality per se. This would require the use of survey data
and the development of a measure of workers’ orientation towards customers. Then, one
could determine which type of employees firms hire and if their hiring decisions depend
on the industry and/or the degree of competition.
6 Robustness Checks
In this section, I show that the main results of the paper are robust to relaxing some of the
assumptions of the baseline model. In particular, I analyze the case in which principals do
not have information about the employees’ customer orientation (Subsection 6.1). Then,
I go on to consider an alternative specification of the employees’ customer orientation
(Subsection 6.2). More specifically, customer-oriented employees might be interested in
the total customers’ surplus buying the product from their firm. In Subsection 6.3, I
study the case in which there is limited supply of customer-oriented agents. Finally, in
Subsection 6.4, I consider the case in which each firm also incurs a material cost c per
unit of production.
In each of the following subsections, I illustrate how the different assumptions affect the
main results of the paper and provide some intuitions, while I relegate all the computations
and proofs of the results to Appendix B.
6.1 Asymmetric information on θ
It is not always straightforward to identify customer-oriented employees and recruit them.
It is plausible to assume that principals do not have perfect information on the agents’
types they face. Here, I consider the case in which the employees have private information
about their own customer orientation.
The timing of the baseline model shown in Section 3 is enriched with stage 0, wherein
each agent is privately informed about his own customer orientation.
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To attain separation of types, principals can follow two alternative strategies (see
Chapter 2 in Laffont and Martimort, 2001). One is to offer different contracts for different
types of agents, another is to only hire customer-oriented employees by offering only one
contract that selfish employees would not accept. In the former case, the principals would
pay an information rent to customer-oriented agents in order to attain separation of
types.19 In the latter, only the participation constraint of customer-oriented employees
bind and no information rent is given up to them.20
Remark 2. Under asymmetric information, all firms hire customer-oriented employees.
For t sufficiently high, firms would be better off hiring self-interested agents.
Principals are better off offering a contract just to customer-oriented agents. By doing
so, they are able to offer customer-oriented agents the same contract obtained in the first-
best. This contract will not be accepted by selfish agents and principals do not have to pay
an information rent to the customer-oriented agents. Since the solution is substantially
unaltered as compared to when there is no private information about the employees’
customer orientation, for certain values of the parameters, the prisoners’ dilemma arises.
6.2 Alternative Specification of the Employees’ Customer Ori-
entation
In the baseline model, I have assumed that a customer-oriented employee who works in
firm i cares about the utility of the average customer who buys the product from firm
i. However, this is not the only way to model the preferences of a customer-oriented
employee.
As a robustness check, I now study the case in which a customer-oriented agent who
works in firm i cares about the overall surplus of the customers who buy the product from
firm i.
Let CSi be the sum of the customers’ surplus buying the product from firm i:
CSi ≡
∫ xil
0
[(v + qi − pi)− tx]dx+
∫ xil′
0
[(v + qi − pi)− tx]dx (9)
In the above expression xil is the mass of customers on the left of firm i and xil′ is the
mass of customers on its right.
The utility of an agent who works in firm i is now given by:
V˜i = ωi − 1
2
q2i + θi CSi (10)
I use the notation V˜i to distinguish this case from the baseline specification.
19In this case, the θ-agents would benefit from an information rent stemming from their ability to
possibly mimic the selfish agents. For the θ-agents the incentive constraints are binding, whereas for the
θ-agents the participation constraints bind.
20The selfish agents never choose the contract targeted for the θ-agents because they would obtain a
negative utility.
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Remark 3. Under this alternative specification of the employees’ customer orientation,
firms always hire customer-oriented employees, but they would be better off hiring selfish
employees.
Even with this different specification of customer orientation, there is a unique and
symmetric subgame perfect equilibrium in which each firm hires a customer-oriented em-
ployee. That is, the strategy of hiring a selfish agent is strictly dominated by the strategy
of hiring a customer-oriented employee. Intuitively, an employer could pay a lower salary
to a customer-oriented employee to implement the same quality-price pair requested from
a selfish employee.
However, even if hiring a customer-oriented employee is a dominant strategy, I find
that all firms would obtain higher profits if they colluded to hiring selfish employees.
The employees’ customer orientation impacts on the price, quality, demand, wage and
profits in a similar way irrespective of whether the employees care about the well-being
of the average customer or that of all customers. In particular, the employees’ customer-
orientation has no impact on quality and demand, but it has a negative impact on prices
and wages. Therefore, qualitatively the results continue to be the same. Moreover, in
this case, the negative impact on the prices always outweighs the negative impact on the
wages. Namely, with this alternative specification of the employees’ customer orientation,
the results are even stronger as firms are always trapped in a prisoners’ dilemma. This
is because under this alternative specification employees weigh the customers’ utility less
and principals have to pay them a higher wage. In particular, now the utility of customer-
oriented employees depends on the mass of customers who are served by their firm. This
mass is negatively affected by the number of firms in the market. In particular, the weigh
attached to this payoff is 1
n
. In contrast, in the baseline model the “customer-orientation”
payoff does not depend on the number of customers who are served and so its weight is 1.
To conclude, depending on the type of customer-oriented preferences, the curse of
hiring customer-oriented employees is more or less magnified. The baseline specification
highlights how the market conditions affect the likelihood that the prisoners’ dilemma
arises.
6.3 Limited Supply of Customer-Oriented Employees
One important assumption of the model is that there is a sufficient supply of customer-
oriented employees. In this way, I have abstracted away from potential problems con-
cerning the firms’ selection of employees with different degrees of customer orientation
when they are in limited supply. This simplifying assumption has allowed me to better
focus on the impact of the presence of customer-oriented employees on firms’ profits and
customers’ satisfaction, which is the main purpose of this article.
In this subsection, I relax this assumption considering what happens when customer-
oriented employees are scarce. If there is a limited supply of customer-oriented employees,
an employee’s outside option will depend on the offer he receives from the other firms in
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the market. Following Englmaier and Leider (2012), I model the bargaining occurring
between firms and employees. In particular, I assume that firms alternate their offers to
the employees, and each employee accepts the contract if it is superior to his current offer.
The firms stop when each employee accepts the contract.
When there are few customer-oriented employees in the market, firms obtain higher
profits by hiring customer-oriented rather than selfish agents. Suppose there is just one
customer-oriented agent who is hired by firm i. The quality provided by firm i is higher
than the quality provided by the competitors. A higher quality leads to a higher demand
and a higher price.21
As the firm that hires the customer-oriented agent obtains a comparative advantage
in terms of quality, demand and price, with respect to the rival firms, firm i has to offer
a contract that provides a sufficiently large rent to the customer-oriented agent so as to
prevent a counter-offer from the other firms. Of course, this additional rent is costly to
firm i and coincides with the difference in the profits obtained by hiring the customer-
oriented rather than the selfish agent. Firm i offers the customer-oriented agent a higher
wage than the one received by selfish agents up to the point at which all firms will be
indifferent between hiring customer-oriented or selfish employees. As a result, the final
contract will be perceived as “neutral”.
Remark 4. With limited supply of customer-oriented agents, firms would be better off if
all of them hired selfish agents.
The profits obtained by firms when all of them decide to hire selfish employees are
always greater than the ones obtained when just one firm hires the customer-oriented
agent.
The limited supply of customer-oriented agents may explain why we often observe
that firms operating in the same sector behave in a different way concerning their choices
of wages, qualities, and prices.
6.4 Different Production Technology
For ease of exposition, in the baseline model the cost of production of the good only
consists of the employee’s wage (ω). In other words, I have so far assumed that the
marginal cost of producing the good is equal to 0. More realistically, firms bear costs other
than the salary of their manager and these may depend on the amount of production.
In this subsection, I analyze the model assuming that each firm incurs a material cost c
per unit of production, like in the standard Salop model. Since the unit cost is going to
impact on the price charged by the firms, the condition for which the market is covered
must be adapted.22
21This result is similar to the one obtained under monopoly.
22In particular, the condition is satisfied and all customers buy a unit of the good/service when t ≤
2
3 (vn+ 1− c).
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The profit of firm i is:
pii = (pi − c)di − ωi (11)
When this is the case, there is a unique and symmetric subgame perfect equilibrium of
the game in which each firm hires a customer-oriented employee, sets
qMMM =
1
n
, pMMM = t
(
1
n
− 3
4
θ
)
+ c,
and offers a wage which makes the employee’s participation constraint bind, i.e.
ωMMM =
1
2n2
− θ
[
v +
1
n
−
(
t
n
− 3
4
tθ
)
− c− t
4n
]
.
Firms share the demand in the market dMMM =
1
n
and profits are realized
piMMM =
(
1
n
)(
t
n
− 3
4
tθ
)
−
[
1
2n2
− θ
(
v +
1
n
−
(
t
n
− 3
4
tθ
)
− c− t
4n
)]
.
It is simple to compare these results with those obtained in Lemma 2. In particular, quality
and demand are not affected by c, whereas firms charge a higher price as c increases. This
effect has a negative impact on the customers’ surplus and, as a result, firms have to
compensate customer-oriented employees with a higher wage to satisfy their participation
constraints. Finally, the higher wage impacts negatively on firms’ profits.
Remark 5. All firms would obtain higher profits if they colluded to hiring self-interested
rather than customer-oriented agents whenever t > tˆ = 4(nv+1−nc)
8− 3n θ .
The strategy of hiring a customer-oriented employee continues to be the dominant one.
I find that the prisoners’ dilemma is more likely to arise as c increases. As c takes higher
values, customers’ surplus shrinks and customer-oriented employees receive a higher wage.
This leads to a reduction in firms’ profits. In contrast, c would not impact on the wage
paid to selfish employees. Moreover, the effect of c on the price is the same irrespective of
whether firms hire selfish or customer-oriented employees. The main result of the paper
still holds and it is even stronger. Introducing a material cost of production c in the
analysis increases the likelihood of having the prisoners’ dilemma. However, it must be
noticed that c reduces the interval of the parameters under which the market is covered.
7 Concluding Remarks
In this paper I have modeled an employee as “customer oriented” when he is interested
in the customers’ well-being. While the marketing literature has stressed how firms can
benefit from hiring this type of motivated employees, I have shown that this may not be
true in a competitive environment. Employees’ customer orientation has a countervailing
effect on firms’ profits. A higher customer orientation has a negative effect on the price
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of the product offered by the firms and, as a result, it impacts negatively on profits.
However, customer-oriented employees receive a lower wage than selfish employees and
this positively impacts on profits. Which effect dominates depends on the degree of
differentiation of the products offered by the firms, on the number of firms, and on the
degree of customer orientation. When the negative effect on profits due to the reduction
in the price dominates the positive effect due to the reduction in the wage, firms would
obtain higher profits by hiring selfish rather than customer-oriented employees. However,
firms are trapped in a prisoners’ dilemma as the strategy of hiring self-interested agents is
dominated by the strategy of hiring customer-oriented agents. Hence, the very presence
of customer-oriented agents may hurt firms.23
One testable implication of the paper is that we should observe that in more concen-
trated markets the strength of the relationship between the employees’ customer orienta-
tion and the firms’ profits is mitigated. Concerning the service sector, some articles in the
marketing literature provide some empirical evidence which is consistent with this predic-
tion. These articles find that the relationship between the employees’ customer-orientation
and the firms’ profits depends on the intensity of competition and their arguments are in
line with the results found in my article.24
The results found under competition stand in stark contrast with those obtained under
monopoly. When there is only one firm in the market, this firm always benefits from hiring
a customer-oriented employee. A higher customer orientation induces the firm to increase
both quality and price. For each unit of the product which is sold, the firm is able to charge
a higher price to accompany the increase in product quality. Crucially, the monopoly is
also able to attract new customers and enjoys an increase in the demand. Moreover, since
the customers’ surplus has increased, the relationship between customer orientation and
wage is negative.
The model is solved under the crucial assumption that the market is covered. If the
market were not covered, the degree of differentiation of the products would be so high
that firms could act as monopolists with the potential customers who are located near
them. In other words, each firm would be located so far away from its rivals that it
would not actually compete with them. If this were the case, the analysis and the results
would be very similar to those obtained under monopoly: by hiring a customer-oriented
employee a firm could increase its demand and enjoy higher profits. As a result, firms
would not be hurt by the presence of customer-oriented employees.
Another crucial assumption is that motivated employees exhibit pure altruism, i.e.
23Caring about customers does not always guarantee profitability as can be observed in the US airline
industry (see the case of Virgin America as reported in the article of The New York Times on September
7, 2013. The article raises the question: “can an airline make money and still be beloved?”).
24Kohli and Jaworski (1990) and Day and Wensley (1988) argue that when competition is weak, em-
ployees’ customer orientation does not play an important role in the customers’ choice because customers
are stuck with the organizations’ products and services. By contrast, they suggest that when competition
is fierce, customers have many alternative options. In this case, employees’ customer orientation plays a
key role in satisfying the customers’ needs and it is a key determinant of firms’ performance.
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they care about the customers’ well-being. This stands in contrast with impure altruism
which would lead to a model where motivated employees derive utility from the quality
of the good they provide. If motivated employees were merely interested in quality, the
strategic effect on the price would not arise and firms would not be hurt by the presence
of motivated employees. It must be said that the existing experimental evidence mostly
supports the assumption of impure altruism. However, there is also a body of literature
that finds evidence that individuals exhibit pure altruistic preferences.
For future research, it would be important to understand whether motivation (in the
form of customer orientation) can be crowded in or out by actions that the principal can
take (see Frey et al., 1997, Benabou and Tirole, 2003, and Akerlof and Kranton, 2005)
and how the presence of motivated agents affects the organizational form of the firms. In
this regard, Ghatak and Mueller (2011) stress the importance of understanding the firms’
organizational choice between for-profits and not-for-profits in a (labor) market setting.
Moreover, it is natural to think of motivated workers in the public service provision, such as
health care and education sectors (see for example Francois, 2000, and Delfgaauw and Dur,
2008).25 When the analysis focuses on these sectors, it is important to take into account
that in many countries these services are provided by both public and private institutions.
Since in numerous markets for-profit firms compete with cooperative firms and non-profit
organizations, there is a growing literature on mixed oligopoly (see for example Casadesus-
Masanell and Ghemawat, 2006, and Marini et al., 2015).26 Considering a mixed oligopoly
environment, in Manna (2016) I study the interaction between public and private firms
and analyze how the presence of customer-oriented employees impacts on the firms’ profits
and social welfare.
Finally, the analysis of the impact of different forms of employees’ motivation on
the customers’ satisfaction and on the firms’ profits can be extremely useful for firms
in the selection of the right applicant for a specific job. Firms make increasingly use of
personality tests to hire employees for positions across many levels in an organization.27
This practice may allow firms to have a better understanding of the preferences of the
potential candidates for a job position (see Englmaier et al., 2016).
25Indeed, the empirical evidence has documented the presence of motivated employees in the health
care sector showing that job satisfaction crucially depends on both monetary and non-monetary aspects of
employment (see Shields and Ward, 2001, Antonazzo et al., 2003, Ikenwilo and Scott, 2007, and Leonard
and Masatu, 2010).
26A mixed oligopoly is in general defined as a market in which two or more firms with different objective
functions co-exist (see for a survey Fraja and Delbono, 1990, and Nett, 1993.)
27In 2001 26% of large U.S. employers used pre-hire assessments and by 2013 the number had climbed
to 57% (see the article of the Wall Street Journal on April 14, 2015: “today’s personality tests raise the
bar for job seekers”).
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A Computations and Proofs of the Results
A.1 Monopoly. Proof of Proposition 1.
I start considering the case in which there is only one firm in the market. In this case,
to guarantee an interior solution, the degree of differentiation of the products t ∈ (1, 2)
and v > 0.28 The equilibrium is determined by backward induction. A customer located
at x obtains a utility from purchasing the good from the monopolistic firm equal to:
v + q − p− tx. In the last stage, the demand of the firm is the following:
d = 2x =
2(v + q − p)
t
. (12)
Knowing the demand, the principal maximizes his profits:
Π = p
[
2(v + q − p)
t
]
− ω (13)
subject to the agent’s participation constraint:
ω − 1
2
q2 + θ U(q, p) ≥ 0, (14)
where U represents the utility of the average customer purchasing the good from the
monopolistic firm:
U = v + q − p− t
2
(
v + q − p
t
)
=
1
2
(v + q − p).
The participation constraint guarantees that the agent accepts the contract. The lowest
wage that satisfies the participation constraint just covers the cost of effort incurred by
the agent minus the direct benefits he derives from his customer orientation:
ω =
1
2
q2 − θ U(q, p). (15)
Substituting equation (15) into equation (13), profits can be rewritten as:
Π = p
[
2(v + q − p)
t
]
− 1
2
q2 +
θ
2
(v + q − p). (16)
The first order conditions with respect to the price and quality are respectively equal to:
∂Π
∂p
= 0 ⇔ 2
(
v + q − p
t
)
− 2p
t
− θ
2
= 0;
∂Π
∂q
= 0 ⇔ 2p
t
− q + θ
2
= 0.
(17)
28The lower and the upper limits on t are such that the principal attains non-negative profits and the
customers derive a non-negative utility.
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In order to prove that the profit function is concave and has a strict global maximum:
∂2Π
∂p2
= −4
t
< 0;
∂2Π
∂q2
= −1 < 0; ∂
2Π
∂p∂q
=
2
t
;
∂2Π
∂q∂p
=
2
t
.
The Hessian matrix is:
H =
(
−4
t
2
t
2
t
−1
)
Notice that it is symmetric and all the leading principal minors have alternate signs:
−4
t
< 0,−1 < 0,
and: (
−4
t
)
(−1)−
(
4
t2
)
=
4(t− 1)
t2
> 0.
Hence, the Hessian matrix is negative definite.
Solving the system of equations (17) yields
q =
v
t− 1 +
tθ
4(t− 1)
p =
tv
2(t− 1) +
tθ(2− t)
8(t− 1)
(18)
In stage 1, the monopolistic firm decides whether to hire a customer-oriented agent with
θ = θ > 0 or a selfish agent with θ = 0. If the firm hires a selfish (S) or a customer-oriented
(M) agent, the optimal levels of quality are:
qS =
v
(t− 1) < q
S + θ
[
t
4(t− 1)
]
= qM , (19)
whereas the prices are:
pS =
tv
2(t− 1) < p
S + θ
[
t(2− t)
8(t− 1)
]
= pM . (20)
Substituting the optimal levels of quality and price into equation (15), the equilibrium
wage is derived:
ωS =
1
2
[
v
(t− 1)
]2
> ωS − tθ
[
8(2− t)v + tθ(3− 2t)
32(t− 1)2
]
= ωM . (21)
And in stage 4, the demand is realized
dS =
v
(t− 1) < d
S + θ
[
t
4(t− 1)
]
= dM , (22)
and the principal obtains the following profits:
ΠS =
v2
2(t− 1) < Π
S +
tθ(8v + tθ)
32(t− 1) = Π
M (23)
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A.2 Competition and Agents’ Motivation
To guarantee an interior solution the following assumption is made.
Assumption 1. The parameters fulfill the following conditions:
 t ∈ (1
2
, 2
3
(vn+ 1)
]
;
 v ∈
[
0, 2−4nθ+5ntθ−3n
2tθ
2
4n2θ
]
;
 θ ∈ (0, θmax] with θmax = (5t−4)+√(5t−4)2+24t6nt .
The lower and the upper limits on t are set such that the principals attain non-negative
profits and the customers derive a non-negative utility. Customers’ valuation v must lie in
the interval specified above otherwise the customer-oriented agents would earn negative
wages. Finally, for v to be non-negative, the agents’ customer orientation θ cannot be
higher than its upper bound.
The model is solved under the assumption that the market is covered. Therefore, the
customers’ participation constraint is satisfied irrespective of whether firms hire customer-
oriented or selfish employees. The utility of the marginal customer buying the service for
firm i is:
Uil =v + qi − pi − txil
=v + qi − pi − t
2
di
(24)
If firms end up hiring selfish employees, the marginal customer will obtain an utility of:
USil = v +
1
n
− t
n
− t
2n
(25)
In contrast, if firms end up hiring customer-oriented employees, the marginal customer
will obtain a utility of:
UMil = v +
1
n
−
(
t
n
− 3
4
tθ
)
− t
2n
(26)
If the number of firms in the market is exogenous, it is simple to see that the marginal
customer is always better off when firms hire customer-oriented employees. Then, if the
marginal customer gets a non-negative utility when the employees are selfish, this will
also be the case when they are customer-oriented. Equation (25) is non-negative if:
v +
1
n
− 3t
2n
≥ 0
This inequality holds when t ≤ 2
3
(vn+ 1) and this is the upper limits on t in Assump-
tion 1. The utility of the marginal customer is non-negative by Assumption 1 and all
customers buys a unit of the good/service.
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A.2.1 The Characterization of the Equilibrium when Agents are Self-Interested
I begin by characterizing the equilibrium when agents are self-interested, i.e. θi = θ = 0.
In the last stage, customers choose from which firm to buy the good. A customer l
is indifferent between firm i and i + 1 if Uil = Ui+1 l, or equivalently v + qi − pi − t xil =
v + qi+1 − pi+1 − t
(
1
n
− xil
)
. This implies that xil =
1
2n
+ (qi−qi+1)+(pi+1−pi)
2t
and similarly
xil′ =
1
2n
+ (qi−qi−1)+(pi−1−pi)
2t
. The demand for firm i is given by xil + xil′ , that is:
di =
1
n
+
[2qi − qi+1 − qi−1] + [pi+1 + pi−1 − 2pi]
2t
. (27)
Since firms are symmetric in the choice of the agents’ type, let qi+1 = qi−1 = qj and
pi+1 = pi−1 = pj. I can rewrite equation (27) as:
di =
1
n
+
[qi − qj] + [pj − pi]
t
. (28)
Principal i maximizes his profits:
pii = pi
[
1
n
+
(qi − qj) + (pj − pi)
t
]
− ωi, (29)
subject to the agent i’s participation constraint:
ωi − 1
2
q2i ≥ 0
Principal i will set the lowest ωi which satisfies the participation constraint:
wi =
1
2
q2i (30)
Substituting equation (30) into equation (29), profits can be rewritten as:
pii = pi
[
1
n
+
(qi − qj) + (pj − pi)
t
]
− 1
2
q2i . (31)
First order conditions:
∂pii
∂pi
= 0 ⇔
[
1
n
+
(qi − qj) + (pj − pi)
t
]
− pi
t
= 0;
∂pii
∂qi
= 0 ⇔ pi
t
− qi = 0.
(32)
The first order conditions depend also on the qualities and prices chosen by the rival
firms. Since I am considering the case in which rival firms make the same hiring decision,
it follows that firm j’s first order conditions mirror those of firm i. Therefore, I solve the
following system of equations: 
pi =
t
2n
+
qi−qj+pj
2
pj =
t
2n
+
qj−qi+pi
2
qi =
pi
t
qj =
pj
t
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From the first two equations:
pi =
t
n
+
qi − qj
3
.
Then,
qi =
1
t
(
t
n
+
qi − qj
3
)
=
1
n
+
qi − qj
3t
.
Similarly,
qj =
1
n
+
qj − qi
3t
⇔ qj (3t− 1)
3t
=
1
n
− qi
3t
⇔ qj = 1
n
(
3t
3t− 1
)
− qi
3t− 1 .
Substituting qj, qi can be rewritten as:
qi
(3t− 1)
3t
=
1
n
− 1
n
(
1
3t− 1
)
+
qi
3t(3t− 1) ⇔
qi(3t− 1)2
3t(3t− 1) =
3t− 2
(3t− 1)n +
qi
3t(3t− 1)
9t2 − 6t
3t(3t− 1)qi =
3t− 2
(3t− 1)n ⇔ qi =
1
n
= qj
The principals elicit quality’s levels
qSSS =
1
n
, (33)
with wages
ωSSS =
1
2n2
. (34)
The chosen prices are:
pSSS =
t
n
. (35)
A reduction in t leads to a reduction in the prices of both firms. As t goes to 0 the firms
offer always more similar products. The firms are more competitive and the prices go
down.
Firms share the demand in the market:
dSSS =
1
n
, (36)
and each principal obtains the following profits by hiring a selfish agent:
piSSS =
2t− 1
2n2
. (37)
The profits obtained by the firms are increasing in t and decreasing in n.
A.2.2 Characterization of the Equilibrium when Agents are Customer-Oriented
I determine the equilibrium when all agents are customer-oriented, i.e. θi = θ > 0.
Firms are symmetric in the agents’ customer orientation and the demand for firm i is
equal to:
di =
1
n
+
[qi − qj] + [pj − pi]
t
. (38)
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Principal i maximizes his profits:
pii = pi
(
1
n
+
(qi − qj) + (pj − pi)
t
)
− ωi, (39)
subject to the agent i’s participation constraint:
ωi − 1
2
q2i + θU i(qi, pi) ≥ 0.
The lowest wage that satisfies the agent i’s participation constraint is:
ωi =
1
2
q2i − θU i(qi, pi), (40)
where the average customers’ utility from buying a product from firm i is:
U i =
[
v + qi − pi − t
4
(
1
n
+
(qi − qj) + (pj − pi)
t
)]
Thus, equation (39) can be rewritten in the following way:
pii = pi
(
1
n
+
(qi − qj) + (pj − pi)
t
)
−1
2
q2i +θ
[
v + qi − pi − t
4
(
1
n
+
(qi − qj) + (pj − pi)
t
)]
.
(41)
First order conditions:
∂pii
∂pi
= 0 ⇔
[
1
n
+
(qi − qj) + (pj − pi)
t
]
− pi
t
− 3
4
θ = 0
∂pii
∂qi
= 0 ⇔ pi
t
− qi + 3
4
θ = 0
(42)
Following the same argument developed when the agents are all selfish, I solve this
system of equations: 
pi =
t
2n
+
qi−qj+pj
2
− 3
8
tθ
pj =
t
2n
+
qj−qi+pi
2
− 3
8
tθ
qi =
pi
t
+ 3
4
θ
qj =
pj
t
+ 3
4
θ
From the first two equations:
pi =
t
n
+
qi − qj
3
− 3
4
tθ.
Then,
qi =
1
t
(
t
n
+
qi − qj
3
− 3
4
tθ
)
+
3
4
θ =
1
n
+
qi − qj
3t
.
The next steps are equal to the ones shown in the previous subsection when all agents
are selfish.
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The optimal levels of quality are:
qMMM =
1
n
. (43)
The prices are given by:
pMMM = t
(
1
n
− 3
4
θ
)
. (44)
When agents are motivated, the price of the products offered by firms is lower than in
the previous case, pMMM < p
S
SS. The effect of θ on the price is negative. This fall in price
has a positive impact on the customer’s utility but negatively affects firms’ profits.
The wages are given by:
ωMMM =
1
2n2
− θ
[
v +
1
n
−
(
t
n
− 3
4
tθ
)
− t
4n
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
U
M
>0
. (45)
The upper limit on t is set such that the customers derive a non-negative utility. The
agents’ customer orientation has a negative impact on wages. Customer-oriented employ-
ees provide a given level of quality for a lower wage. This benefits firms.
Firms share the demand in the market:
dMMM =
1
n
, (46)
and profits are realized:
piMMM =
(
1
n
)(
t
n
− 3
4
tθ
)
−
[
1
2n2
− θ
(
v +
1
n
− 5
4
t
n
+
3
4
tθ
)]
. (47)
Proof of Proposition 2.
Assume to the contrary that piSkl ≥ piMkl for some k, l ∈ {S,M}. This would imply that
there exist k, l ∈ {S,M} such that
dSkl p
S
kl −
1
2
(qSkl)
2 ≥ dMkl pMkl −
1
2
(qMkl )
2 + θ U
M
kl .
If it were the case, principal i would decide to implement the same schedule (qSkl, p
S
kl) by
hiring customer-oriented agents, but paying them a lower wage. Because piSkl < pi
S
kl+θ U
S
kl,
this leads to a contradiction.
A Prisoner’s Dilemma. Proof of Proposition 3.
The profits obtained by hiring self-interested agents are higher than the profits ob-
tained by hiring customer-oriented agents if the following condition is met:
piSSS − piMMM =
4θ(2t− 1)− nθ(4v + 3tθ)
4n
> 0,
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which is the case whenever the following holds:
t > tˆ =
4(nv + 1)
(8− 3nθ) .
The condition of Proposition 3 does not contradict Assumption 1. The threshold value of
t above which firms would obtain higher profits by hiring selfish agents is always in the
interval if:
4(nv + 1)
(8− 3nθ) <
2
3
(nv + 1)
12(nv + 1) < 2(nv + 1)(8− 3nθ)
6(nv + 1) < (nv + 1)(8− 3nθ)
6nv + 6 < 8nv + 18− 3n2vθ − 3nθ
2nv + 2− 3n2vθ − 3nθ > 0
2− 3nθ + 2nv − 3n2vθ > 0
2− 3nθ + nv(2− 3nθ) > 0
(2− 3nθ)(1 + nv) > 0
That is always the case by Assumption 1.29 This means that it is always possible to find
values of the parameters such that the prisoners’ dilemma arises.
A.3 Quality-Oriented Employees. Proof of Proposition 4
The utility function of a motivated agent who only cares about quality and works in firm
i is:
Vˆi = ωi − 1
2
q2i + θqi
Firm i maximizes its profit function:
pii = pi
[
1
n
+
(qi − qj) + (pj − pi)
t
]
− ωi
subject to the employees’ participation constraint:
ωi − 1
2
q2i + θqi ≥ 0
Principal i will set the lowest ωi that satisfies the participation constraint:
ωi =
1
2
q2i − θqi
29Notice that if the number of the firms increase, the upper limit for θ to obtain an interior solution
decreases. The product nθ must be always lower than 23 .
37
Substituting the previous equation into the maximization problem of firm i, profits can
be rewritten as:
pii = pi
[
1
n
+
(qi − qj) + (pj − pi)
t
]
− 1
2
q2i + θqi
First-order conditions are:
∂pii
∂pi
= 0⇔
[
1
n
+
(qi − qj) + (pj − pi)
t
]
− pi
t
= 0
∂pii
∂qi
= 0⇔ pi
t
− qi + θ = 0
Since firms are symmetric, firm j’s first order conditions mirror those of firm i. Therefore,
I have to solve the following system of equations:
pi =
t
2n
+
qi−qj+pj
2
pj =
t
2n
+
qj−qi+pi
2
qi =
pi
t
+ θ
qj =
pj
t
+ θ
From the first two equations:
pi =
t
n
+
qi − qj
3
.
Then,
qi =
1
t
(
t
n
+
qi − qj
3
)
+ θ
=
1
n
+
qi − qj
3t
+ θ.
Similarly,
qj =
1
n
+
qj − qi
3t
+ θ
=
(
1
n
+ θ − qi
3t
)(
3t
3t− 1
)
=
(
1
n
+ θ
)(
3t
3t− 1
)
− qi
3t− 1 .
Substituting qj, qi can be rewritten as:
qi
(3t− 1)
3t
=
(
1
n
+ θ
)
−
(
1
n
+ θ
)(
1
3t− 1
)
+
qi
3t(3t− 1)
qi(3t− 1)2
3t(3t− 1) =
(
1
n
+ θ
)(
3t− 2
3t− 1
)
+
qi
3t(3t− 1)
9t2 − 6t
3t(3t− 1)qi =
(
1
n
+ θ
)(
3t− 2
3t− 1
)
[
3t(3t− 2)
3t(3t− 1)
]
qi =
(
1
n
+ θ
)(
3t− 2
3t− 1
)
qi =
1
n
+ θ
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The unique solution is the symmetric equilibrium in which each firm elicits the follow-
ing quality
qˆMMM =
1
n
+ θ, (48)
with wages
ωˆMMM =
1
2n2
− θ
2
2
. (49)
The chosen prices are:
pˆMMM =
t
n
. (50)
Firms share the demand in the market:
dˆMMM =
1
n
, (51)
and each principal obtains the following profits by hiring a quality-oriented employee:
pˆiMMM =
2t− 1
2n2
+
θ
2
2
. (52)
The profits increase with t and θ, but decrease with n. Firms are always better off
hiring quality-oriented employees.
A.4 Endogenous Market Structure
When agents are self-interested, the number of firms is equal to:
nS =
⌊
nˆS
⌋
;
where nˆS =
√
(2t− 1)√
2F
.
(53)
In the above equation, nS is the greatest integer less than or equal to nˆS.30
Remark 6. When agents are self-interested, the number of the firms increases with the
degree of product differentiation t and decreases with the cost of entry F .
Proof. When all agents are selfish, profits are:
piSSS =
(2t− 1)
2n2
− F.
The derivative of the previous equation with respect to n can be written as:
−(2t− 1)
n3
< 0,
where the term is negative because of Assumption 1. Hence profits are decreasing in n.
Moreover, profits are decreasing in F and increasing in t. Hence, n must be decreasing in
F and increasing in t.
30Notice that due to the integer problem, the profits firms can attain may be slightly higher than 0.
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A lower t means that products are more substitutable leading to lower equilibrium
prices and profits. Similarly, it is straightforward that a reduction in the fix cost F
increases the number of the firms leading to a reduction in profits.
The employees’ customer orientation has an impact on the profits obtained by firms,
and then on the number of firms present in the market. When employees are customer-
oriented, the number of the firms is equal to:
nM =
⌊
n̂M
⌋
;
where n̂M =
θ(2t− 1) +
√
2(2t− 1)(4F − 4vθ − 2θ2 + tθ2)
(−4F + 4vθ + 3tθ2)
.
(54)
In the above equation, nM is the greatest integer less than or equal to n̂M .
Remark 7. When agents are customer-oriented, the number of the firms increases with
the degree of product differentiation t, with the cost of entry F , and increases with v. The
impact of the agents’ customer orientation θ is ambiguous.
Proof. When all agents are customer-oriented, profits are:
piMMM =
(
1
n
)(
4t− 3ntθ
4n
)
− 1
2n2
+ θ
[
v +
1
n
−
(
t
n
− 3
4
tθ
)
− t
4n
]
− F.
The derivative of the previous equation with respect to n can be written as:
−(1− n θ)(2t− 1)
(n3)
< 0
where the overall effect is negative due to Assumption 1. Hence profits are decreasing
in n. Moreover, profits are decreasing in F and increasing in t and v. Hence n must be
decreasing in F and increasing in t and v.
The agent’s customer orientation θ has a countervailing effect on the number of firms.
On the one hand, a high customer orientation reduces the price. The reduction in the
price has a negative impact on the profits and then on the number of firms. On the other
hand, high customer orientation reduces the wage. This effect has a positive impact on
the profits and then on the number of firms.
Akin to the previous case, when products are more substitutable (lower t) the equilib-
rium prices decrease leading to a reduction in gross profits. A reduction in the fix cost F
increases the number of firms leading to a reduction in gross profits. In addition, a high
valuation of the good v has a positive impact on the profits (due to a reduction in the
wage) and on the number of firms. The effect of the agents’ customer orientation on the
number of firms is ambiguous. If the negative impact on the revenues (reduction in the
price) is greater than the positive impact due to the reduction in the costs (reduction in
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the wage), the agents’ customer orientation has a negative impact on the number firms.
Otherwise, it impacts positively on the number of firms.
Proof of Remark 1. Comparing the number of firms obtained in the two different
cases, I find that when the prisoners’ dilemma occurs nS ≥ nM . In this case, the prof-
its obtained by hiring selfish individuals are higher than the profits obtained by hiring
customer-oriented employees, i.e. piSSS > pi
M
MM . As a result, the number of firms in the
market is higher or equal to the number of firms when agents are customer-oriented. In
this case, customer orientation has a countervailing effect on the customers’ utility due to
a reduction in the number of firms and to a reduction in the price charged by the firms.
It not immediate to see which effect dominates. Remember that the average customer’s
utility derived from buying a product from firm i when all agents are selfish and when all
agents are customer-oriented are equal to the following, respectively:
U
S
= v +
1
nS
− 5t
4nS
; U
M
= v +
1
nM
− 5t
4nM
+
3
4
tθ.
Comparing the two equations, the following result is obtained:
U
M
> U
S
if
(
1
nM
− 1
nS
)(
1− 5
4
t
)
+
3
4
tθ > 0.
This is the case when:
θ >
(
1
nS
− 1
nM
)(
4− 5t
3t
)
. (55)
When the prisoners’ dilemma occurs, the gross profits obtained by hiring self-interested
agents are higher than those obtained by hiring customer-oriented agents, and so is the
number of firms, i.e. nS ≥ nM . When this happens(
1
nS
− 1
nM
)
≤ 0.
Notice that equation (55) is always satisfied when t < 4
5
. Otherwise, equation (55) is
satisfied only if the agent’s customer orientation is sufficiently high. When the number of
firms is endogenous, the agents’ customer orientation may have a negative impact on the
customers’ utility. This happens when t is sufficiently high and θ is sufficiently low.
B Robustness Checks
B.1 Asymmetric Information on θ
If principals offer different contracts designed for different types of agents, they would pay
an information rent to customer-oriented agents in order to attain separation of types.
The θ-agents would benefit from an information rent stemming from their ability to mimic
the selfish agents. For the θ-agents the incentive constraints are binding, whereas for the
θ-agents the participation constraints bind.
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As long as there is perfect competition in the labor market, i.e. there are an infi-
nite number of agents of both types, principals are better off offering a contract just to
customer-oriented agents. Each principal has only to satisfy the participation constraint
of the customer-oriented agent:
V M = ωM − 1
2
q2M + θ U
M ≥ 0.
And the selfish agents never accept the contract because they obtain a negative utility:
V S = V ((ωM , qM), θ) =
1
2
q2M − θ UM − 1
2
q2M = −θ UM < 0.
As a result, for a value of t sufficiently high firms are trapped in a prisoner’s dilemma.
B.2 Alternative Specification of the Employees’ Customer Ori-
entation
If a customer-oriented agent who works in firm i cares about the overall surplus of the
customers who buy the product from firm i, his utility is:
V˜i = ωi − 1
2
q2i + θiCSi
where CSi is the sum of the customers’ surplus buying the product from firm i with xil
be the mass of customers on its left and xil′ be the mass of customers on its right. It can
be written as:
CSi =
∫ xil
0
[(v + qi − pi)− tx]dx+
∫ xil′
0
[(v + qi − pi)− tx]dx
=(v + qi − pi)(xil + xil′)− t
∫ xil
0
x dx− t
∫ xil′
0
x dx
=(v + qi − pi)(xil + xil′)− t
2
[x2il + x
2
il′ ]
(56)
Remember that the demand for firm i is given by xil + xil′ .
Proposition 2 continues to hold. An employer could pay a lower salary to a customer-
oriented employee to implement the same quality-price pair requested from a selfish em-
ployee. However, in what follows I show that all firms would obtain higher profits if they
colluded to hiring selfish employees. To show this result, I determine the equilibrium
when all employees are customer-oriented.
Principal i maximizes its profits:
pii = pi
(
1
n
+
qi − qj + pj − pi
t
)
− ωi (57)
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subject to the agent’s i participation constraint V˜i ≥ 0. Firm i will set the lowest ωi that
satisfies the participation constraint:
ωi =
1
2
q2i − θCSi
=
1
2
q2i − θ
[
(v + qi − pi)di − td
2
i
4
]
=
1
2
q2i − θdi
[
(v + qi − pi)− t
4
di
]
=
1
2
q2i − θ
(
1
n
+
qi − qj + pj − pi
t
)
(v + qi − pi) + t
4
θ
(
1
n
+
qi − qj + pj − pi
t
)2
(58)
Firm i’s profits can be rewritten as:
pii = pi
(
1
n
+
qi − qj + pj − pi
t
)
+
−
[
1
2
q2i − θ
(
1
n
+
qi − qj + pj − pi
t
)
(v + qi − pi) + t
4
θ
(
1
n
+
qi − qj + pj − pi
t
)2]
(59)
First order conditions are:
∂pii
∂pi
= 0 ⇔
[
1
n
+
(qi − qj) + (pj − pi)
t
]
− pi
t
− θ
[
1
2
(
1
n
+
qi − qj + pj − pi
t
)
+
(v + qi − pi)
t
]
= 0
∂pii
∂qi
= 0 ⇔ pi
t
− qi + θ
[
1
2
(
1
n
+
qi − qj + pj − pi
t
)
+
1
t
(v + qi − pi)
]
= 0
(60)
To obtain the optimal levels of quality and price, I solve the following system of equations:
pi =
(t+npj−nqj)(2−θ)+nqi(2−3θ)−2nvθ
n(4−3θ)
pj =
(t+npi−nqi)(2−θ)+nqj(2−3θ)−2nvθ
n(4−3θ)
qi =
npi(2−3θ)+npjθ−nqjθ+tθ+2nvθ
n(2t−3θ)
qj =
npj(2−3θ)+npiθ−nqiθ+tθ+2nvθ
n(2t−3θ)
And I find that the quality provided by each firm is q˜i =
1
n
. It does not depend on θ and
is equal to the one found when I have considered the average customers’ utility.
Each firm charges the following price:
p˜i =
t(2− θ)
2n(1− θ) −
θ
n
[
1 + vn
(1− θ)
]
.
Again, an increase in the employees’ customer orientation reduces the prices charged by
the firms, and this impacts negatively on profits.
Customer-oriented employees receive a wage of:
ω˜i =
2− 6θ + 5tθ − 4nvθ − 3tθ2
4n2(1− θ)
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At the same time, an increase in θ has a negative impact on wages.
Firms share the demand in the market d˜i =
1
n
and profits are realized:
p˜ii =
[(
t(2− θ)
2n(1− θ)
)
− θ
n
(
1 + vn
(1− θ)
)](
1
n
)
−
(
2− 6θ + 5tθ − 4nvθ − 3tθ2
4n2(1− θ)
)
After some simple computations, profits can be rewritten as:
p˜ii =
4t− 2− 3tθ
4n2
All firms obtain higher profits by hiring selfish rather than customer-oriented employees
if:
p˜iS − p˜iM = 2t− 1
2n2
− 4t− 2− 3tθ
4n2
=
3tθ
4n2
> 0
which is always the case. The main results of the paper still hold and they are even more
robust under this specification. In particular, the negative impact on the price of the
employees’ customer orientation always outweighs the negative impact on the wage. As
a result, the employees’ customer orientation has a negative impact on the firms’ profits
and firms are always trapped in a prisoners’ dilemma.
B.3 Limited Supply of Customer-Oriented Employees
As a robustness check, I consider the case in which the number of customer-oriented
employees is lower than the number of firms in the market. Let m be the number of
customer-oriented employees with m < n. In this case, an employee’s outside option will
depend on the offer he receives from the other firms in the market.
For the sake of simplicity, I assume that there are just three firms and three employees
in the market. Just one employee is customer-oriented with θ > 0, i.e. m = 1, whereas
the other employees in the market are selfish with θ = 0.31 Suppose that firm 1 is the firm
which ends up hiring the customer-oriented employee. The equilibrium is determined by
backward induction.
In stage 4, the customers choose which good to buy and the demand for firm 1 will
be:
d1 =
1
3
+
(2q1 − q2 − q3) + (p2 + p3 − 2p1)
2t
If firm 1 succeeds in hiring the customer-oriented employee, firms 2 and 3 are “forced” to
hire selfish agents and by symmetry q2 = q3 = q and p2 = p3 = p. Then, the demand for
firm 1 can be rewritten as:
d1 =
1
3
+
q1 − q + p− p1
t
In contrast, the demand for firms 2 and 3 is equal to:
d =
1
3
+
q − q1 + p1 − p
2t
31This case can be easily generalized to the case in which there are n firms and n employees but just
one is customer-oriented.
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Knowing its demand function, firm 1 chooses the price to maximize its profits, taking
qualities and wages as given:
pi1 = p1
(
1
3
+
q1 − q + p− p1
t
)
− ω1
subject to the following participation constraints:
ω1 − 1
2
q21 + θU1 ≥ 0
ω1 − 1
2
q21 + θU1 ≥ R
where R ≥ 0 represents the customer-oriented employee’s outside option that is deter-
mined by the competitive offers he receives in the first stage of the game. As the second
constraint binds, the principal has to offer a contract that gives the agent a higher ex-
pected utility than the one found previously.
In contrast, the rival firms maximize their profits:
pi = p
(
1
3
+
q − q1 + p1 − p
2t
)
− ω
subject to the following participation constraint:
ω − 1
2
q2 ≥ 0
First order conditions are:
∂pi1
∂p1
= 0 ⇔ − p1
t
+
1
3
+
q1 − q + p− p1
t
− θ = 0
∂pi1
∂q1
= 0 ⇔ p1
t
− q1 + θ = 0
∂pi
∂p
= 0 ⇔ − p
2t
+
1
3
+
q − q1 + p1 − p
2t
= 0
∂pi
∂q
= 0 ⇔ p
2t
− q = 0
(61)
To obtain the optimal levels of quality and price, I solve the following system of equations:
p1 =
t
6
+ q1−q+p
2
− tθ
2
p = t
3
+ q−q1+p1
2
q1 =
p1
t
+ θ
q = p
2t
Firms elicit the following levels of quality:
q1 =
16t− 6 + 9tθ
18(2t− 1)
q =
20t− 12− 9tθ
36(2t− 1)
(62)
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Each firm charges the following price:
p1 =
4t(8t− 3) + 2tθ(9− 12t)
36(2t− 1)
p =
t(20t− 12− 9tθ
18(2t− 1)
(63)
The employee’s customer orientation has a negative impact on the price set by each firm.
However, this negative impact is higher on firm 1 than on the other firms.
The wages paid to the employees are the following:
ω1 =
1
2
(
16t− 6 + 9tθ
18(2t− 1)
)2
− θ
[
v +
16t− 6 + 9tθ
18(2t− 1) −
(
4t(8t− 3) + 2tθ(9− 12t)
36(2t− 1)
)
− t
2
(
16t− 6 + 9tθ
18(2t− 1)
)]
+R
ω =
1
2
(
20t− 12− 9tθ
36(2t− 1)
)2
(64)
Notice that, because of competitive pressure, the motivated agent will receive a com-
pensation that consists of the difference in firms’ profits, i.e. R = pi1− pi. In other words,
firms 2 and 3 would be willing to pay as much as the profits differential to hire him.
The demand of each firm is:
d1 =
16t− 6 + 9tθ
18(2t− 1)
d =
20t− 12− 9tθ
36(2t− 1)
(65)
and profits are realized:
pi1 =
(
4t(8t− 3) + 2tθ(9− 12t)
36(2t− 1)
)(
16t− 6 + 9tθ
18(2t− 1)
)
− 1
2
(
16t− 6 + 9tθ
18(2t− 1)
)2
+
+ θ
[
v +
16t− 6 + 9tθ
18(2t− 1) −
(
4t(8t− 3) + 2tθ(9− 12t)
36(2t− 1)
)
− t
2
(
16t− 6 + 9tθ
18(2t− 1)
)]
−R
pi =
(
t(20t− 12− 9tθ
18(2t− 1)
)(
20t− 12− 9tθ
36(2t− 1)
)
− 1
2
(
20t− 12− 9tθ
36(2t− 1)
)2
(66)
B.4 Different Production Technology
The condition that satisfies the customers’ participation constraint changes. More specif-
ically, t is set in such a way that the customers derive a non-negative utility irrespective
of whether firms decide to hire a selfish or a customer-oriented employee. If the marginal
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customer gets a non-negative utility when the employees are selfish, this will also be the
case when they are customer-oriented. This is the case when:
USil = v +
1
n
− t
n
− c− t
2n
≥ 0
The previous inequality holds when t ≤ 2
3
(vn+ 1− c). When this condition is satisfied,
all customers buys a unit of the good/service.
Principal i maximizes his profits:
pii = (pi − c)
(
1
n
+
(qi − qj) + (pj − pi)
t
)
− ωi,
subject to the agent i’s participation constraint:
ωi − 1
2
q2i + θiU i(qi, pi) ≥ 0.
The lowest wage that satisfies the agent i’s participation constraint is:
ωi =
1
2
q2i − θiU i(qi, pi),
where the average customers’ utility from buying a product from firm i is:
U i =
[
v + qi − pi − t
4
(
1
n
+
(qi − qj) + (pj − pi)
t
)]
Thus, firm i maximizes the following:
pii = (pi−c)
(
1
n
+
(qi − qj) + (pj − pi)
t
)
−1
2
q2i +θi
[
v + qi − pi − t
4
(
1
n
+
(qi − qj) + (pj − pi)
t
)]
.
First order conditions:
∂pii
∂pi
= 0 ⇔
[
1
n
+
(qi − qj) + (pj − pi)
t
]
− (pi − c)
t
− 3
4
θi = 0
∂pii
∂qi
= 0 ⇔ (pi − c)
t
− qi + 3
4
θi = 0
Following the same argument developed when the agents are all selfish, I solve this
system of equations: 
pi =
t
2n
+ c
2
+
qi−qj+pj
2
− 3
8
tθi
pj =
t
2n
+ c
2
+
qj−qi+pi
2
− 3
8
tθi
qi =
(pi−c)
t
+ 3
4
θi
qj =
(pj−c)
t
+ 3
4
θi
From the first two equations:
pi =
t
n
+ c+
qi − qj
3
− 3
4
tθi.
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Then,
qi =
1
t
(
t
n
+ c+
qi − qj
3
− 3
4
tθi − c
)
+
3
4
θ =
1
n
+
qi − qj
3t
.
After some simple computations, each firm provides the following quality:
qi =
1
n
.
The prices are:
pi = t
(
1
n
− 3
4
θi
)
+ c.
The wages are given by:
ωi =
1
2n2
− θi
[
v +
1
n
−
(
t
n
− 3
4
tθ
)
− c− t
4n
]
.
Firms share the demand in the market:
di =
1
n
,
and profits are realized. In equilibrium, all firms end up hiring customer-oriented employ-
ees, i.e. θi = θ > 0, and profits are:
piMMM =
(
1
n
)(
t
n
− 3
4
tθ + c− c
)
−
[
1
2n2
− θ
(
v +
1
n
− 5
4
t
n
− c+ 3
4
tθ
)]
.
In contrast, if all firms would be able to collude hiring selfish employees, i.e. θi = 0,
profits are:
piSSS =
(
1
n
)(
t
n
+ c− c
)
−
(
1
2n2
)
The prisoners’ dilemma occurs when piSSS > pi
M
MM . That is when(
1
n
)(
t
n
)
−
(
1
2n2
)
>
(
1
n
)(
t
n
− 3
4
tθ
)
−
[
1
2n2
− θ
(
v +
1
n
− 5
4
t
n
− c+ 3
4
tθ
)]
.
The previous condition is satisfied when:
t >
4(nv + 1− nc)
8− 3nθ .
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